Wager

Pascal presents an argument in the Pensées, a collection of notebook fragments published posthumously in 1670, in favour of religious belief that sharply departs from tradition. Whereas the ontological argument aims to prove the certainty of God’s existence, Pascal invites us to wager on God. That is, Pascal cedes to the atheist the sheer improbability of God’s existence. Nonetheless, the wager functions as a pragmatic defence of the rationality of Christianity because the potential gain if God exists (eternal paradise) is infinite. It is always worth risking whatever finite happiness can be gained from indulging in the worldly pleasures of this life for the chance, however small, to win the infinite. The rational choice, in Pascal’s terms, must be to believe in God as far as faith offers any chance of salvation.

There is an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won, one chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what you are staking is finite. That leaves no choice; wherever there is an infinity … there is no room for hesitation … you must be renouncing reason if you hoard your life rather than risk it for an infinite gain (418).

Voltaire objected to Pascal’s wager on the grounds that it ‘is really indecent and childish: the idea of gambling, of losing and winning, is quite unsuitable to the dignity of the subject’ (Voltaire, 10). Voltaire is right that that the word wager possessed and still possesses negative, even licentious connotations, and in this respect it is surprising that Pascal chose a wager to defend his notoriously strict Christianity. However, just because an activity is in some contexts disreputable, it does not follow that it is always so. To determine whether Voltaire’s objection is as persuasive as it might seem, I will compare Pascal’s wager with a type of wager that is uncontroversially objectionable: the husband’s wager on the fidelity of his wife.

C. W. Wilson, after R. Westall. Cymbeline, Act 2, Scene 4, Rome, an apartment in Philario’s House, Posthumus, Philario, and Iachimo. 1796. Engraving. Folger Shakespeare Library (LUNA: Folger Digital Image Collection). Licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

The husband who wagers on his wife is a classic figure of scorn. In Mozart’s Così, the inappropriateness of the wager is easily identified; it is a losing bet. Both husband and wife are far from faithful, and therefore the acceptance of the wager serves only to underline the superficiality of the relationship. However, the similar case of Leonatus’ wager with Giacomo in William Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1610/11) suggests there is something undignified about wagering on the fidelity of one’s wife even when winning is likely. The subject of the bet, Leonatus’ wife Innogen, is, we are told, ‘alone, th’Arabian bird’(1.6, 16); supremely virtuous. Nonetheless Giacomo tells Leonatus that:

I will lay you ten thousand ducats to your ring that, commend me to the court where your lady is, with no more advantage than the opportunity of a second conference, and I will bring from thence that honour of hers which you imagine so reserved (1.4. 130-134).

After some cajoling, Leonatus agrees to the wager. Although superficially this acceptance seems to indicate the confidence Leonatus has in Innogen, there is something more sinister at work. Giacomo makes his ‘wager rather against your confidence than her reputation’ (1.4 113-4), and is able to ‘win’ the wager through falsely convincing Leonatus that Innogen has strayed. Leonatus, far from his previous bravado, is easily persuaded even before the most convincing evidence has been presented. Filario exclaims, dismayed: ‘This is not strong enough to be believed / Of one persuaded well of’ (1.4. 131-2). Leonatus’ acceptance of the wager, rather than being proof of his faith, instead comes to highlight the opposite trait, his faithlessness and susceptibility to jealousy.

Voltaire might say that the play demonstrates that only a faithless husband would wager on dignified subjects such as marriage. However, I believe that there is a distinction between the wagers of Pascal and Leonatus that actually serves to defend Pascal from Voltaire’s charge. Leonatus takes the wager in order to prove that the bet is too good to refuse, that it can be taken at any odds, because there is no doubt over the outcome. In other words, Leonatus believes that marital contentment requires certainty. In this Leonatus’ love resembles not Pascal’s faith, but the ‘faith’ of the ontological philosopher, which is based on the belief that God’s existence has been demonstrated, beyond doubt, by theoretical reason.

By contrast, Pascal admits that God’s existence is theoretically uncertain; and yet encourages the wager for God nonetheless. In so doing ‘wagering’ captures an important aspect of Pascalian faith, the idea that faith involves a total commitment to an uncertain outcome. The prominence of prudential over theoretical reason for faith is further captured by Pascal’s affirmation that it is ‘the heart which perceives God and not the reason’ (423) and that ‘the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing’ (422). Seen in this light, Leonatus’ wager is not a commitment of the heart, but an attempt to deny the risk inherent in committing to another person. His acceptance, therefore, displays his faithlessness in revealing his inability to understand that love exists because of, not in spite of, uncertainty.

Notably it is said of the faithful Innogen that ‘Love’s reason’s without reason’ (4.2. 22). Cymbeline, therefore, seems to endorse a view of faithful love that is, in fact, proto-Pascalian. A virtuous husband would not have felt obliged to take Giacomo’s wager, because he would have felt no need to prove the theoretical certainty of his wife’s fidelity. His love would, be based instead on the reasoning of the heart, on a total commitment to an uncertain outcome, on the Pascalian wager already inherent in marriage. Voltaire’s moral objection therefore falls flat; Pascal’s wager is crucially distinct from the indignity of Cymbeline’s wager.

Pascal’s use of the word wager indicates that, alongside its more sordid connotations, it possessed certain aspects that were well admired by the early modern mind. ‘Wagering’ opens oneself up to risk in a way that was seen as constituting faith (for Pascal) and love (for Shakespeare) insofar as only truly virtuous love admits the fallible humanity of the beloved. It is only after ‘losing’ the wager that Leonatus realises his misconception of this feature of marriage.

… You married ones,
If each of you should take this course, how many
Must murder wives much better than themselves
For wrying but a little (5.1. 2-5).

Arun Dolan is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy at King’s College London.

Selected Bibliography.

Pascal, Blaise and Krailsheimer, A. J. Pensées; translated with an introduction by A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth, 1966).

Shakespeare, William. Cymbeline, ed. Valerie Wayne (Arden, 2017).

Voltaire, M de. Remarks on Mr Pascal’s Thoughts, trans. T. Smollet, T. Francklin, and Others. (London, 1763).

26 March 2021.